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I
INTRODUCTION

Japanese constitutional theory is built on the proposition that pacifism,
popular sovereignty, and the guarantee of fundamental human rights are the
foundations of the Constitution. This article shows that these principles lie at
the heart of an understanding of both the Japanese Constitution and Japan's
democracy. For four decades, Japan has witnessed no constitutional crisis;
that is, no political, governmental, or social issue has appeared that has either
threatened the constitutional order or revealed a serious defect in it. The
proof of this statement is that there has been no constitutional amendment,
although many have been proposed. There has been constitutional
controversy but no crisis. This stability demonstrates much about the actual
operation of Japan's constitutionalism and provides a basis for a reading of
the state of democracy in Japan in this last decade of the twentieth century.
This article examines the role of these three principles in Japanese
constitutional culture. In addition, it illustrates how the principles have
affected the course of the Constitution in action. Finally, the article shows
how the principles serve as a guide for speculation about the future of the
Japanese Constitution.
II
PACIFISM AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE

Pacifism as a constitutional principle is most peculiar. It has nothing to do
with the structure of government, the powers of its constituent elements, the
role of the people, or the relationship between the government and the
people, all of which are primary constitutional concerns. Pacifism does,
however, have every right to its position as a fundamental principle.
The principle of pacifism is expressed in the Constitution's second
chapter, consisting of the single famous Article 9. The basic points ofJapan's
pacifism expressed therein are: the renunciation of war and the threat or use
of force as a sovereign right of the nation in settling international disputes;
the perpetual nonmaintenance of land, sea and air forces; and the nonCopyright © 1990 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor Emeritus, University of Massachusetts.
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recognition of the right of belligerency. Article 9 is buttressed by both Article
66, which requires that the prime minister and all ministers of state be
civilians, and the lack of provisions relating to the responsibility of citizens
either to bear arms in defense of the nation or to serve in a peacetime militia.
How did such an unequivocal statement of pacifism get into Japan's
fundamental law? A great deal of effort has been expended in attempts to
ascertain the exact details, but the answer is to be found in the broad picture,
not the details. Article 9 arose out of a lost war and a military occupation
controlled by a policy calling for a complete disarmament of Japan and, for
whatever reasons, determined to bring about a revision of the nation's

fundamental law.
It was war that fathered constitutional pacifism in Japan, and it was war
that began its erosion. In June 1950, a few weeks after the third birthday of
Article 9, the Korean War, a white-hot development of the Cold War, broke
out. One side was rabidly anti-communist and the other side fervently
communist. One side was supported by American/United Nations armed
forces, while the other side was supported by Chinese military forces and the
Soviet silent partner. Battles raged only a few hundred miles from Japan,
which, by being a vital American base, had become passively involved.
For Japan's pacifism, the result was a departure from both the letter and
the spirit of Article 9. With the active encouragement of the United States,
the Japanese government took the following steps: First, in 1950, it
established the paramilitary National Police Reserve ("NPR"). Then, in 1951,
it simultaneously concluded both a general treaty of peace that recognized
Japan's inherent right of self-defense and a security treaty with the United
States that recognized Japan's right to enter into collective security
arrangements and to assume responsibility for its own defense. In 1952, after
the Occupation, it converted the NPR into the National Safety Force that
would have more obvious military characteristics. Finally, in 1954, it created
the present Self-Defense Forces ("SDF").I Although the Japanese
government willingly took all of these steps, it was confronted with intense
opposition from those concerned with preserving Article 9.
Why has the principle of pacifism survived such considerable pressure?
One significant reason is something that did not occur. Fortunately or
unfortunately, according to one's own point of view, Article 9 did not include
General MacArthur's original recommendation that the proposed constitution
contain a renunciation of war "as an instrumentality for settling [Japan's]
disputes and even for preserving its own security." 2 That omission opened the way
for the development of the official Japanese position that, even though Article
1. For an account of Japan's rearmament in the early stages of development of the 1947
Constitution, see MakiJapan 's Rearrnament: Progress and Problems, 8 W. POL. Q 545 (1955). The text
of the Jieitai H6 (Self-Defense Forces Law) can be found in the current edition of RoPP6 ZENSHO
(THE COMPLETE SIX CODES), the basic unofficial collection ofJapan's national laws.
2. SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, REPORT OF GOVERNMENT SECTION, THE
POLITICAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN, SEPTEMBER 1945 TO SEPTEMBER 1948, at 102 (1949) (emphasis

added).
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9 is silent on the matter, the nation enjoys the inherent right of self-defense,
an argument given substance by its inclusion in both the security and peace
treaties mentioned above.
The law establishing the SDF carefully avoids open conflict with Article 9.
For example, "Ground, Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces" is a verbal
attempt to avoid violation of the Article 9 prohibition against the maintenance
of "land, sea, and air forces." Other provisions clearly limit both the SDF's
military mission to the defense of the nation through the establishment of firm
civilian control over mobilization in emergencies, as well as prohibiting
3
political activity (save voting) by SDF members.
The apparent unconstitutionality of the SDF has not been resolved, but in
the first important case involving the problem of national security, the
Supreme Court ruled in the famous Sunakawa decision of 19594 that the U.S.
security treaty did not contravene Article 9 because the government, in
concluding the treaty, and the Diet, in ratifying it, were exercising the
inherent right of self-defense. The SDF was not at issue in this case, but the
Court's reasoning would seem to apply to it as well as to the security treaty.
In addition to using the self-defense doctrine, the Court reasoned that
defense measures were acts of state, which were exempt from judicial review
unless they were clearly unconstitutional. It seems fairly safe to predict that
the Supreme Court will not rule on the constitutionality of the SDF until a
concrete legal dispute arises out of the question Qf whether the government
has developed the strength of the SDF to the point where it is clearly
unconstitutional.
Will the SDF ever develop beyond its present defensive state? It may be
impossible to predict the answer, but it is possible to sketch out the forces that
will influence the direction of the growth of Japanese military strength.
The basic determining factor in the growth of Japan's military strength is
the nation's strategic geographic position. The nation's island nature
transforms its surrounding seas into a defensive moat. This fact has two
major implications for defense. First, Japan has no long land frontiers to
defend. Second, any potential invader would have to possess major land, sea,
and air forces, as well as the will to suffer the losses that even a limited
defense could inflict. Thus, it would appear that the defensive moat creates a
difficult problem for a potential invader with a consequent decrease ofJapan's
defensive problem.
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the absence of military
power in East and Southeast Asia was an open invitation to an armed and
aggressive Japan. Today the situation is dramatically different. Two of
Japan's near neighbors and earlier victims-Russia and China-are great
military powers. The third near neighbor, Korea, once a defenseless victim,
3.
4.

Maki, supra note 1, at 555-57.
Sakata v. Japan (The Sunakawa Case), 13 Keishi 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959). For

an English translation of this decision, see J. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 1948-60, at 289-361 (1964).
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now has two military forces, either of which would be a formidable opponent.
Such nearby military strength means that if Japan were ever seriously to
consider using military force as it once did, it would have to aspire to
becoming, again, a military giant.
It would seem that the combination of the defensive moat and the current
military superiority of Japan's neighbors will provide some built-in restraints
on the growth of the SDF. But at least two other factors operate to limit the
growth of the SDF. One factor is that Japan is not attractive as a potential
target. The other factor is the memory of Japan's history of aggression.
Japan has none of the traditional attractions for foreign aggression. Its
territory is already crowded with people. Its lack of natural resources, once a
powerful drive behind its own aggression, is no temptation. The nature of the
weapons, both conventional and nuclear, of contemporary war insures that an
aggressor would destroy precisely those things it might covet, namely Japan's
industry, technology, consumer base, trained labor force, and store of
technical and scientific personnel.
The historical memory of the victims of the now-vanished Japanese
military provides political, psychological, and economic brakes on the
expansion of Japanese military strength. Even after official Japanese
apologies for the past, China, Korea, and the southeast Asian nations have
reacted vigorously against revisionist accounts of the country's past
aggression in Japanese domestic textbooks. Thus, it is easy to imagine their
reaction against a significant growth of Japan's military establishment. Japan
takes very seriously the fact that yesterday's victims are today's highly valued
(and profitable) customers.
Two other external circumstances will help to determine the future of
Japan's constitutional pacifism. For more than twenty years, the United States
Government has been exerting steady pressure on Japan to assume more
responsibility for its own defense. The argument of the United States is
simple: The buildup of the SDF will reduce U.S. involvement in Japan's
security and, as a consequence, reduce the drain on U.S. military and
economic resources. The Japanese government has yielded slowly but
apparently not unwillingly, judging by the gradual growth in its defense
budget and the lack of contentiousness on its part over the issue. Only future
events will determine the degree of continuing pressure by the United States
and the consequent impact on pacifism as a principle.
The other circumstance that will help determine the future of Japan's
constitutional pacifism is the development of President Gorbachev's twin
policies for a reduction of Soviet military power and for a diplomacy of peace.
Gorbachev's words have a ring of sincerity long missing from Soviet
international discourse, but it remains to be seen whether his words can be
converted into credible action. If his words can be converted, they are bound
to influence Japanese thinking on security issues.
As important as strategy and external influences are in determining the
future of the SDF, the final decision will be made by theJapanese Government
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and will grow out of domestic, psychological, political, and social
considerations. Foremost among these considerations is the deep scar left on
the national psyche by the tragedy of the lost war with its suffering, death, and
devastation. That is why Article 9 was so warmly received. That is why each
erosive step was met with such broad opposition. During the 1980s public
opinion polls showed an increase in popular acceptance of both the SDF and
the security arrangements with the United States. The real test, however, will
come when and if the Japanese Government attempts to advance beyond the
current situation.
In spite of the strength of pacifism, there has been a visible, vocal, and
persistent countermovement. Many Japanese, both leaders and followers,
firmly believe that Article 9 is no more than a humiliating reminder of both
the bitterness of a lost war and the disgrace of a military occupation. This
attitude has been one of the most powerful motivating forces for those who
would revise not only Article 9 but other provisions of the Constitution.
There is no denying the strength of this view and its powerful nationalistic
appeal. Those holding this opinion are members of the generation that grew
up between the two world wars and, as a result, were molded in their youth
and early adulthood by the militaristic and authoritarian (to say nothing of
antidemocratic) content of both indoctrination and propaganda. It can be
argued, however, that it is only a matter of time before this generation and its
views become a part of an unhappy history.
The disappearance of a generation inevitably raises the question of the
successor generation. How will pacifism fare at the hands of a generation that
has lived in ignorance of (and freedom from) war? It can be argued that as
war vanishes from the collective memory and becomes a matter of words in
history without experiential underpinnings, future generations of Japanese
will come under the sway of the fatal attraction of war and, as a result, both
Article 9 and pacifism will vanish from the national agenda. In rebuttal, it can
be argued that Japan alone, among the principal actors on the international
scene, has had the happy experience of having escaped war, either civil or
international, for almost half a century. It is conceivable, but not guaranteed,
that the preservation of the advantages of a warless society may outweigh the
dangerous attraction that war seems to hold for humankind.
Japan's recent warless past has had an important consequence in the
decoupling of the military from Japanese society, a striking contrast with the
situation that existed in the half century between 1895 and 1945. The firm
and pervasive interweaving of the old military into Japanese society was one
key to an understanding of the old militarism. Neither the SDF nor the
military uniform command anything like the prestige, respect, and honor
enjoyed by the old and vanished military. In addition, the SDF has been
confined to a very small niche in government, politics and, significantly, the
national budget.
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Whither pacifism as a constitutional principle? The answer lies in times to
come. But the future of pacifism is firmly bound to the fate of both
constitutionalism and democracy in Japan.
III
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY As A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE

As important as pacifism is as a constitutional principle, popular
sovereignty and the guarantee of fundamental human rights determine the
essential nature of Japan's democracy. These two principles place Japan
squarely in the company of the older democracies of the West to which
belongs the honor of having developed the theory, content, and practice of
one of the major patterns of government and politics in the modern world.
Popular sovereignty was a concept absent from Japan's historical
experience. It is not surprising that it was missing from the Meiji Constitution
since its drafters were concerned with making the people the objects of
gove.nment under imperial sovereignty, not participants in or molders of
government and politics. In order for Japan to become a democracy, it was
necessary to devise a fundamental law that would guarantee the people the
broadest possible participation in government.
The general principle is stated, without the use of the term, in the
preamble to the Constitution:
Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the
people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and
the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people.5 This is a universal principle of
mankind upon which this Constitution is founded.

It is not surprising that this passage looks as though it were translated from a

foreign language, as it appeared to both Japanese and foreigners in 1946.
The thoughts were indeed strange, even revolutionary, in terms of the history

of Japanese political thought.

Strictly speaking, however, the preamble's

language is mere rhetoric.
The principle of popular sovereignty was stated in the text of the

Constitution simply as a subordinate clause in Article 1: "The Emperor shall
be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position
from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." A
revolution was embodied in those brief thirty words. In the Meiji
Constitution the emperor was sovereign. From that constitution stemmed the
system-authoritarian in 1889 and through almost all the first half of the
twentieth century-that made the Japanese people subjects of a godlike
emperor.
From the last five words of Article I flow all the constitutional provisions
that convert the words into the structure of an operating democratic
government: fundamental human rights that are indivisibly joined to popular
sovereignty; the inalienable right of the people to choose and dismiss public
5.

1947 CONST. preamble.
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officials; universal adult suffrage; the secrecy of the ballot and nonresponsibility for the vote; the right of peaceful petition; the National Diet as
"the highest organ of state power"; 6 the responsibility of the cabinet to the
Diet; the popular review of Supreme Court justices; and an amendment
process under which amendments must originate in the Diet and be ratified by
the electorate.
This array of provisions clearly places the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of the government under the ultimate control of the people.
This control is exercised through free elections in which the citizenry is able
to cast its vote without government coercion. In view of the key importance of
free elections, it is perhaps odd that they are not explicitly guaranteed. The
explicit guarantees of universal adult suffrage, the secrecy of the ballot, nonaccountability for the vote, and such freedoms as assembly, association, and
speech, however, constitute a de facto guarantee of free elections.
The history of free elections in Japan since 1946 demonstrates beyond
question that there has been no governmental interference in either the
elections or their outcomes. The electoral system is unassailably democratic
in this sense and stands in striking contrast to authoritarian election systems,
including Japan's under the Meiji Constitution.
Popular sovereignty as a system and as created by the provisions
summarized above has worked effectively, but there are shortcomings and
defects within the system that bear examination. The defects are remediable,
however, not crippling.
Although the Diet is "the highest organ of state power," 7 practice has
demonstrated that there is a noticeable gap between principle and reality.
First, there is the problem of the bureaucracy, which, of course, is both the
body and soul of the executive branch. Although the people have the
inalienable right to appoint and dismiss public officials, the bureaucracy
consists of a body of individuals who, in the normal course of their operations,
are held no more accountable for their official acts than the citizenry is for its
vote. The nonelective status of bureaucrats insulates them from the vagaries
of politics and, within the limits of official discipline, guarantees them
permanent enjoyment of a prestigious career.
It is also frequently pointed out that the bureaucracy wields considerable
power through its authority to issue administrative rules, regulations, and
opinions. The exercise of this discretionary power is not purely arbitrary. It
is authorized by legislation, a demonstration of legislative supremacy. The
argument that this legislative check is largely meaningless is not without
merit. The fact remains, however, that what is granted by legislation can be
taken back by legislation. Thus, the issue here is political, not constitutional.
In general, democratic political systems are characterized by competition
between or among a diversity of political parties, which is necessary if there is
6.

7.

Id. art. 41.
Id.
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to be a peaceful transfer of power through free elections. Japan has been an
exception. For more than a third of a century, the Diet has been controlled by
the conservative Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP"). Yet, that single party has
stayed in power through a series of free elections, a phenomenon that
decisively separates Japan from typical single-party systems. For whatever
reasons, the Japanese people have chosen to live under a government
controlled by the LDP. Although the LDP has not been a party without sin, it
has not committed the most unforgivable one under democracy-it has not
exercised coercive governmental force to keep itself in power.
Today, the LDP is confronting a critical test. A number of factors have
converged to create a situation in which the voters may be at long last
prepared to desert the LDP. Such factors include the self-erosive effect of a
long, unbroken tenure of power; the tainting effect on virtually the entire LDP
leadership of the Recruit scandal (involving the alleged manipulation of its
stock by the Recruit Company for the benefit of LDP politicians); the
unpopularity of a highly controversial consumption tax both sponsored and
enacted by the LDP; and a scandal involving sexual liaisons-not normally a
political issue in Japan-of a prime minister who, on appointment, seemed to
be one of a very small number of politically safe LDP leaders. The LDP's
unprecedented losses in the 1989 House of Councillors election were very
substantial straws in the wind. The House of Representatives election,
scheduled for early 1990, will determine whether or not the LDP will finally
lose its grip on the government.
If the election was simply a means of kicking the rascals out, the result
would seem to be a foregone conclusion. But elections call for voting for
someone, not simply against someone; what of the opposition? First, the
opposition is ideological, consisting principally of two socialist parties, a
communist party, and a party regarded as being religiously affiliated. Second,
no opposition party has had any experience in running a post-occupation
government. The LDP opposition is confronted with a difficult double task of
blurring its ideological image and persuading voters to make allowances for
inexperience.
A problem closely related to the one-party issue is money politics-not
necessarily corruption in either government or politics, but simply the
capacity for full coffers to skew the political process. The undeniably
conservative nature of the LDP has naturally made it the favorite of business.
Japan is not alone among the democracies in being confronted with money
politics. Again, this is a political, not a constitutional, problem.
Finally, there is the problem of malapportionment in the Diet. No
significant changes have taken place in the apportionment of seats in either
house since the system was established in the late 1940s. The snail-like pace
of reapportionment, despite the great increase of the urban population, has
created serious underrepresentation of urban areas.
Malapportionment, as is true everywhere, is a child of politics. One of the
principal bases of LDP power has been the conservative rural electorate.
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Consequently, the LDP has been blind to the necessity for reapportionment,
which would have the inevitable result of increasing the seats in the cities, the
locus of the opposition's strength. It is difficult to envisage a situation in
which reapportionment would result in anything other than the destruction of
the LDP domination of the Diet.
Again, malapportionment is a political problem representing an erosion of
the principle of popular sovereignty. But there is a considerable gap between
erosion and destruction. Judicial decisions, however, have intimated that only
political action can remove this defect.
In 1983, the Supreme Court rejected a plea of unconstitutionality
involving alleged malapportionment of seats in the House of Councillors,
holding that unconstitutionality would arise only when "population changes
result in such excessive inequality in the value of votes as might be regarded
as completely unacceptable" and when "no countermeasures have been taken
within the discretionary power of the Diet after complex and difficult policy
deliberations and decisions." 8
The Court seemed to argue that
malapportionment should be dealt with as a political matter.
A striking feature of Japan's system of government under popular
sovereignty is that it has worked successfully. After more than forty years of
experience, not a single grave defect in the structure of government has
developed, at least not a defect serious enough to have created the necessity
(as distinct from the desirability in the eyes of some) for constitutional
amendment.
Under the system, Japan has survived situations of considerable stress,
such as the massive demonstrations of 1960 against the U.S. security treaty
and the student violence of the late 1960s. Japan also has witnessed an
historically unprecedented rise in the level of the people's livelihood. Finally,
under the system, Japan has escaped any threat to its national security and has
become an economic superpower, resulting in an increase in its international
stature. This is not to argue that Japan is perfect, but the government, as a
manifestation of popular sovereignty, has managed to deal effectively with the
problems of its people.
IV
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN

An understanding of fundamental human rights is essential in the
taxonomy of twentieth century political systems. The guarantee of
fundamental human rights is the embodiment of democracy, while the lack of
such a guarantee means no democracy. Japan's Constitution, which provides
for fundamental human rights, places the country clearly in the democratic
8. See Shimizu v. Osaka Election Comm'n (The Osaka Malapportionment Case), 37 Minshai 345
(Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 27, 1983). This case will also appear in a volume of Supreme Court decisions
edited by Lawrence W. Beer and Hiroshi Itoh.
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camp. The unorthodox manner in which the guarantee of fundamental
human rights became a basic constitutional principle requires brief review.
As is true of popular sovereignty, the principle of fundamental human
rights had its origins in the military Occupation. An occupation is by nature a
most unlikely vehicle for the development of popular sovereignty because it is
the negation of freedom, involving as it does the subjugation of the occupied
by the occupier. In addition, any military organization is undemocratic
because military discipline requires unquestioning obedience and a
consequential
suppression
of individual
freedoms.
Nevertheless,
democratization was one of the basic objectives of postsurrender policy for a
defeated Japan.
The nature of the Occupation in 1945 determined that it would be
supportive, not suppressive, of democratic tendencies. The fact that the
Occupation was overwhelmingly American meant that the American
democratic tradition provided the political and psychological coloration of the
Occupation. Out of that framework came the Occupation policy of
democratization. By accident, the commander-in-chief of the Occupation was
a man who, while being the very model of a general, possessed a complex
personality, one strand of which was a philosophical conviction that
democracy was the most desirable form of government. Finally, staff
personnel responsible for carrying out the policy of democratization were
themselves the products and representatives of a democratic political society.
Thus, a serendipitous combination of policy, personality, and personnel
tempered the military nature of the Occupation and supported the
introduction of the principle of fundamental human rights. The implantation
of fundamental human rights in the immediate postwar period, then, was
facilitated by an occupation that was committed to the destruction of an old
authoritarian order intimately linked with war and aggression and inimical to
the establishment and guarantee of fundamental human rights. It was in the
destruction of the old order that the element of subjugation was most
apparent in the Occupation.
That fundamental human rights were not imposed on a defeated, sullen,
and resistant Japanese people has been demonstrated by the phenomenally
rapid rooting of those rights in Japanese society. If Americans were
responsible for introducing fundamental human rights as a basic principle of
democratic constitutionalism, then it was the Japanese who in practice
adopted and cultivated them and have harvested the fruits.
As is true of popular sovereignty, there is nothing in the centuries of
premodern Japanese history that nurtured the concept of fundamental human
rights as it has developed in the past few centuries of Western democratic
experience. The concept did not appear in Japan until just over a century
ago. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 recognized their existence by listing a
number of them, which was a huge concession in view of their historical
absence from the Japanese political vocabulary; but these rights were not
guaranteed. For each right, the Constitution stated that it could be enjoyed
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only "within the limits of the law," which made restrictions on them
constitutional.
Even before the Meiji Constitution, there was a battery of restrictive laws
on human rights. From the beginning there was tension between the tiny
minority of Japanese who supported the enjoyment of human rights and the
existing constitutional (as well as the subsumed political, governmental, and
legal) restrictions on them. The restrictions easily prevailed, as illustrated by
the dark valley of wartime authoritarianism. The destruction of the repression
of the old regime cleared the way for the introduction of fundamental human
rights.
Central to the creation of a new democratic constitutional order was the
recognition of a new role for the individual, not as the passive object of an
authoritarian order, but as the active repository of fundamental human rights.
The Constitution provides that all of the people "shall be respected as
individuals" 9 and be "equal under the law" 10 and shall be free from
discrimination "in political, economic or social relations because of race,
creed, sex, social status or family origin."" An imposing structure of
freedoms and rights is built on this basic framework. The rights to petition
2
and to sue for redress for damages caused by illegal acts of public officials'
temper the direct impact of government on the private citizen. The
Constitution guarantees individuals an impressive list of freedoms, including
freedom of thought, religion, assembly, association, speech, press "and all
other forms of expression," as well as freedom to choose and change one's
residence and occupation and academic freedom.' 3 Marriage is based on
"equal rights of husband and wife," and laws relating to marriage are to be
14
based on "individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes."'
In the economic sphere, the people have the right "to maintain the
minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living" and the right "to an
equal education correspondent to their ability."' 5 In addition, the right and
obligation to work, the right of workers to "organize and to bargain and act
16
collectively," and the right to own and hold property are all guaranteed.
7
Finally, ten Articles' protect the rights of those charged with criminal acts.
Although these guarantees might appear to be unrestricted, Article 12 sets
forth the responsibilities that accompany the enjoyment of all rights and
freedoms. It provides that the freedoms and rights must be maintained by
"the constant endeavor of the people." In other words, they are not to be

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

1947 CONST. art. 13.
Id. art. 14.
Id. art. 24.
Id. arts. 16, 17.
Id. arts. 19-23.
Id. art. 24.
Id. arts. 25-26.
Id. arts. 27-29.
Id. arts. 31-40.
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accepted passively. This injunction has certainly been heeded, as anyone
acquainted with the resistance to constitutional revision is aware.
Article 12 links "constant endeavor" to two potentially restrictive
responsibilities. First, the people must refrain from "any abuse of these rights
and freedoms." Second, the people must "always be responsible for utilizing
them for the public welfare." "Abuse" and "public welfare" are imprecise
and elastic terms open to a range of interpretation. Although both are
limiting, a narrow interpretation would make them permissive, while a broad
interpretation would make them restrictive. "Public welfare" has become
constitutional doctrine, but "abuse" has not because it is subsumed under the
doctrine of public welfare.
There is no account of how and why the public welfare doctrine was
introduced into the Constitution.' 8 Hence, the following remarks are only
speculative. First, the doctrine may be implicit in democratic theory. It may
spring from the fact that human society is made up of individual human
beings, and consequently a natural limitation on individual freedom of action
is the possibility that it may result in positive injury to fellow individuals or to
the collective well-being. Americans involved in the drafting process must
have been aware of this limitation on absolute freedom.
On the Japanese side, two other considerations may have led to the
inclusion of the public welfare doctrine. First, Japanese history and tradition
were lacking an emphasis on the role of the individual. It would have been
easy for the Japanese drafters to accept the public welfare limitation as a
natural social balance for the rights and freedoms being newly granted.
Second, the Japanese individual exists as a part of society in a mutually
supportive relationship, not as an isolated individual independent of or
resistant to the pressures and responsibility of society.
The lurking danger in the public welfare doctrine is the inherent
possibility that it might be used much as a within-the-limits-of-law general and
constitutional limitation on the enjoyment of rights and freedoms. This
danger, however, has remained submerged.
Lawrence W. Beer, in his monumental study' 9 of the freedom of
expression in Japan, provides a clear picture of the application of the doctrine
in such important areas as the freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and
expression. Beer's study shows a sizable collection of limitations on freedoms
of expression as they involve specific groups, circumstances, and events.
Under democracy, general limitations on basic freedoms are impermissible,
but episodic limitations under clearly defined circumstances are a far cry from
systematic and systemic suppression of freedom as was the case under the
Meiji Constitution.
18. Conversation in July, 1989, with Charles L. Kades, former Deputy Chief, GHOQ SCAP
(General Headquarters, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Occupation Headquarters, Tokyo).
Kades was a principal in the drafting of the 1947 Constitution.
19. L. BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW, POLITICS AND
SOCIETY (1984).
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Generally, the Japanese Supreme Court has utilized the public welfare
doctrine to maintain a reasonable balance between the individual's enjoyment
of rights and freedoms and the well-being of other individuals and of society
itself. Nevertheless, the Court's position has not remained unchallenged.
The tension between the Court and its critics on this issue and other issues is
an indication of the existence of a healthful environment for democracy.
V
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION TO
JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

In this silver anniversary year of the completion of the work of the
Commission on the Constitution, it is fitting to note its contribution to an
understanding of the three fundamental principles and their role in Japan's
constitutionalism. 20 Widely regarded at the outset of its work in 1957 as a
body designed to bring about a revision of the Constitution, the Commission
failed to gain the participation of the opposition, antirevisionist political
parties, and the great majority of constitutional scholars. Under the law
creating it, the Commission was an investigative and deliberative body. For
seven years it conducted a massive factfinding investigation of almost every
conceivable aspect of the Constitution, deliberating at length on a wide range
of constitutional issues.
The final report was a lengthy account of the results of both the
investigation and the deliberation. Although it included detailed accounts of
the opinions of all the commissioners, a majority of whom clearly favored
some kind of revision, the final report contained no recommendations on
revisions. Even though the law establishing the Commission required it to
submit a report to the Cabinet and for the Cabinet to transmit it to the Diet,
the final report never went beyond the Cabinet.
Under its great and wise chairman, the late Professor Kenz6 Takayanagi,
the Commission contributed impressively to Japan's constitutionalism. It
collected and published a small mountain of information, opinions, and
interpretations about every facet of the Constitution, including the complex
story of its drafting and enactment. It brought to light virtually unanimous
approval of the three fundamental principles. Even those who expressed the
most revisionist views on such matters as the revision of Article 9, the
conversion of the emperor from a symbol to the head of state, the elimination
of the taint of Occupation sponsorship, and the lack of traditional elements in
the Constitution, were warm in their support of the principles. It failed to
bring to light any serious flaw in government or politics that would require an
amendment to correct. It revealed both a breadth of opposition to revision
and a strength of support for the Constitution that would make any serious
20. See COMM'N ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
CONSTITUTION
Maki trans. 1980). The Introduction contains an overall description and evaluation
of the Commission. Parts I and II are the Commission's own account of its establishment,
organization, and operation.

U.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 53: No. I

move toward revision politically unacceptable.
In summary, the
Commission's work revealed how firmly the Constitution had been woven in
two short decades into the fabric ofJapanese society. Nothing has occurred in
the intervening quarter of a century to alter that conclusion.
VI
CONCLUSION

Pacifism, popular sovereignty, and the guarantee of fundamental human
rights have served the nation well. Pacifism, coupled with powerful assistance
from an international situation that has not produced a credible threat to
Japan's security, has spared the country involvement in war and the
staggering costs of becoming a military superpower, thus freeing resources
for the betterment of national life. Popular sovereignty has resulted in a
system of government and politics that has maintained domestic tranquillity,
enabled the government to work effectively, if not perfectly, in addressing
domestic and foreign problems, and spared the country from the debilitating
effects of political instability. Fundamental human rights have permitted both
individuals and groups to function with an unprecedented degree of political,
social, and economic freedom.
The rhetoric, surely not empty in this instance, of the preamble provides
the means for a broader evaluation of the three principles. The Japanese
people have not been "visited with the horror of war through the action of
government" for virtually half a century. They have preserved their "security
and existence" and in the process have come to "occupy an honoured place in
international society." Government has been treated as "a sacred trust of the
people," in spite of a far from flawless performance, through the firm
rejection of revision of its constitutional basis. Political parties, competition
among them, and free elections have assured that the government and its
leaders have derived "their authority from the people," that the powers of
government "are exercised by representatives of the people," and that
beyond challenge the benefits of such a government have been "enjoyed by
the people."
The three fundamental principles have operated powerfully to make a
Constitution, which originated from a military occupation and was based on
concepts arising in a radically different political, social, and historical
environment, into the broadly accepted and firmly rooted fundamental law of
a viable democracy. The people of Japan made the Constitution their own,
and thus carried to completion one of the most successful and significant
political transformations of the twentieth century.
One determination that has yet to be made is whether the Constitution will
endure into the future. We can predict with considerable confidence that as
long as the pattern ofJapanese national life remains roughly as it has been for
the past four decades, the nation will remain stable, and its Constitution will
flourish. We cannot predict the shape of the forces that may change the
course: the shifting patterns of world politics, both near and far from Japan's
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island redoubt; the state of the Japanese and world economies; the social,
political, and economic consequences for Japan of the global environmental
crisis; and the molding influence on constitutionalism of possible fundamental
shifts in the deep currents of Japanese politics.
The year 2005 will be appropriate for reexamining Japan's
constitutionalism. In that year, the Sh6wa Constitution will witness its fiftyeighth anniversary, marking the same span of years covered by the Meiji
Constitution. The national tragedy of a physically and spiritually devastating
lost war brought the old constitutional order to an end. It is not unreasonable
to hope that the fifty-eighth year of the current constitutional order will
witness not a destructive tragedy but a confirmation of the brilliance of the
achievement of the Japanese and American founding fathers in building a
strong, durable, and democratic Constitution based on pacifism, popular
sovereignty, and the guarantee of fundamental human rights.

